Sukhar v. State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507
Bench – G.B. Pattanaik, M. Srinivasan and N. Santosh Hegde, JJ.
Delivered on October 1, 1999
Facts:
The case arose from an incident on 17th April 1978, at 7:30 A.M., near Chak village, Tejalhera, District Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh.
The victim, Nakkal, lodged an FIR at 9:40 A.M. on the same day alleging that: His nephew, Sukhar, had forcibly cultivated his land and refused to share the produce (batai). Due to this property dispute, there existed prior enmity between them. On the day of the incident, while he was walking on the road, Sukhar attacked him from behind and fired a pistol shot at him.
Hearing his cries for help, two witnesses, Ram Kala and Pitam, rushed to the spot. The accused fled from the scene, and the injured Nakkal was taken to the police station by the witnesses. The police registered the FIR and commenced investigation.
PW-5, the doctor who medically examined Nakkal, noted bullet injuries on his person. The accused was arrested, and a charge sheet was filed against him under Section 307 IPC. During trial, PW-2 (Pitam) stated that upon reaching the spot, the injured Nakkal had named Sukhar as the person who fired at him.
The Trial Court convicted Sukhar under Section 307 IPC and sentenced him to five years’ rigorous imprisonment. The Allahabad High Court affirmed the conviction.
Aggrieved thereby, the accused appealed before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the statement made by the injured naming the accused was admissible under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act as part of the doctrine of res gestae.
Reasoning by Court:
Admissibility Under Section 6 of the Evidence Act: The Supreme Court examined whether the statement allegedly made by the injured to PW-2 could be admitted under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, embodying the doctrine of res gestae. The Court held that statements become admissible under Section 6 only when they are made contemporaneously with the occurrence or immediately thereafter, forming part of the same transaction.
Requirement of Contemporaneity: Relying upon Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 1996 SC 2971, and Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., (1997) 4 SCC 161, the Court reiterated that: The time gap between the occurrence and the statement must be minimal. The statement should leave no room for fabrication, tutoring, or external influence. The Court emphasized that spontaneity and immediacy are essential requirements for admissibility under the doctrine of res gestae.
Statement Not Part of the Same Transaction: The Court noted that PW-2 admitted in cross-examination that by the time he reached the place of occurrence, around 20 persons had already gathered there. This circumstance indicated that sufficient time had elapsed after the occurrence, thereby creating the possibility of deliberation or external influence. Accordingly, the Court held that the statement allegedly made by the injured was not sufficiently contemporaneous with the incident to qualify as part of the same transaction under Section 6.
The Court held that: Statements are admissible under the doctrine of res gestae only when they are contemporaneous with the occurrence or immediately connected with it. The time gap between the incident and the statement must be minimal. The statement must not allow scope for fabrication or external influence. Since several persons had gathered at the spot before PW-2 arrived, the statement was not sufficiently contemporaneous to form part of the same transaction under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.