In re: Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India 2025 INSC 1333

Bench – B.R. Gavai, C.J. and Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, P.S. Narasimha and A.S. Chandurkar, JJ.

Delivered on November 20, 2025

The foundation of the proceeding was Presidential Reference made by the President of India on May 13, 2025, in exercise of powers conferred under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India. The reference posed fourteen questions concerning the interpretation of the powers of the Governor under Articles 200 and 201. The context that necessitated the reference included the fact that neither Article 200 nor Article 201 stipulates any time frame for the Governor or President to exercise their constitutional options regarding Bills. Furthermore, there were conflicting judgments of the Supreme Court, and a state of doubt or confusion had arisen, particularly in the aftermath of the decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) 8 SCC 1. The reference was characterised as a ‘functional reference’ dealing with the constitutional mechanics of legislation enactment involving the State Legislature, Governor, and President, which strikes at the root of the Constitution’s federal character.

The opinion of the Court addressed fourteen questions concerning the interpretation of the powers of the Governor and the President regarding the assent, withholding, or reservation of Bills.

I. The Constitutional Options of the Governor (Article 200)

The Court clarified the scope of the Governor’s power when a Bill is presented under Article 200, resolving previous judicial inconsistencies.

Question	Issue	Conclusion	Key Takeaway
Q. 1	What are the Governor’s constitutional options?	The Governor has three constitutional options: 1) to assent to the Bill, 2) to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, or 3) to withhold assent and return the Bill to the Legislature with comments. The option to just withhold assent (without return) alone is rejected. The first proviso to Article 200 (return with comments) is a qualification of the verb “withholds” in the main text, not a fourth independent option. This return-with-comments option is unavailable for a Money Bill.	Assent, Reserve, or Return (if not a Money Bill). The power to simply withhold a Bill and let it “fall through” is constitutionally impermissible as it defies constitutional logic.
Q.2	Is the Governor bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers (CoM)?	The Governor enjoys discretion in choosing among the three constitutional options and is not bound by the aid and advice of the CoM while exercising this function under Article 200. This discretion is necessary because if the Governor were bound by the CoM’’s advice, they could not fulfill their constitutional duty to reserve Bills for the President in situations mandated by the Constitution (e.g., Articles 31A, 254(2)). The inclusion of the phrase “in the opinion of the Governor” in the second proviso is a definitive expression that discretion exists in discharging functions under Article 200, which is a key part of the federal scheme and the system of checks and balances.	Discretion Confirmed. Discretion is vested in the Governor to ensure the protection of the Constitution and the federal scheme, especially where the CoM might be inclined to pass a Bill that requires Presidential consideration.
Q.11	Is a State law valid without the Governor’s assent?	No. There is no question of a law made by the State Legislature coming into force without the assent of the Governor granted under Article 200. The Governor’s legislative role cannot be supplanted by another constitutional authority.	Assent is Mandatory. The Governor’s role is crucial and cannot be bypassed.

II. Justiciability, Immunity, and Inaction

The Court drew a clear line between reviewing the merits of a decision and reviewing inaction by the constitutional head.

Question	Issue	Conclusion	Key Takeaway
Q.3 & Q.6	Are the decisions of the Governor (Art. 200) and the President (Art. 201) justiciable (reviewable on merits)?	No, the discharge of this function is not justiciable; the Court cannot undertake a merits review of the decision taken. This function is part of a non-justiciable dialogic process (advisory, persuasive, deliberative, mediative, and consultative) within the constitutional scheme. Judicial review is only permissible after a Bill becomes law.	Merits Review Barred. The act of granting assent, withholding, or reserving a Bill is a constitutional function beyond judicial merit review.
Q.3 (Inaction)	What remedy exists for the Governor’s prolonged inaction?	In glaring circumstances of prolonged, unexplained, and indefinite inaction, the Court can issue a limited mandamus directing the Governor to discharge the function under Article 200 within a reasonable time period. This limited review addresses institutional accountability when the constitutional scheme is stalled.	Inaction is Reviewable. The Constitution abhors inaction; hence, courts can compel the Governor to act, but cannot dictate the outcome of that action (assent, return, or reserve).
Q.4	Is Article 361 (Personal Immunity) an absolute bar to judicial review of Article 200 actions?	Article 361 is an absolute bar to personally subjecting the Governor to judicial proceedings. However, it cannot negate the limited scope of judicial review permissible in situations of prolonged inaction by the Governor under Article 200. The constitutional office remains subject to the court’s jurisdiction.	Immunity is Personal, Office is Accountable. Personal immunity prevents the Governor from being made answerable in court, but the validity of their actions (or inaction) can still be scrutinised.
Q.9	Can courts adjudicate the contents of a Bill before it becomes law?	No. Courts are not permissible to undertake judicial adjudication over the contents of a Bill, in any manner, before it becomes law. Judicial review applies only after enactment, consistent with constitutional practice.	Bills are Immune. Reviewing Bills before they become law would amount to the judiciary supplanting the legislative wisdom of the Governor/President and destroying the separation of powers. (Note: Advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 is not considered “judicial adjudication”).

III. Timelines and Deemed Assent

The Court firmly rejected the judicial imposition of timelines or the concept of ‘deemed assent’.

Question	Issue	Conclusion	Key Takeaway
Q.5 & Q.7	Can timelines be judicially prescribed for the Governor (Art. 200) and President (Art. 201)?	No. In the absence of constitutionally prescribed time limits, it would not be appropriate for the Court to judicially prescribe timelines. The deliberate omission of timelines (unlike in other Articles) indicates a constitutional design favoring elasticity and institutional respect.	Judicial Restraint. Imposing rigid, universal timelines is contrary to constitutional intent and the fluid nature of the functions involved.
Q.10	Can “deemed assent” be read into Articles 200 or 201, perhaps using Article 142 powers?	No. The Constitution does not allow for the concept of ‘deemed assent’ of Bills. Using Article 142 to achieve deemed assent would be a substitutional role for the judiciary, amounting to a takeover of executive functions, which is impermissible.	No Usurpation of Power. Article 142 cannot be used to pass orders that contradict express or implied constitutional provisions (like the need for formal assent).

IV. Presidential Advice and Unanswered Questions

Question	Issue	Conclusion	Key Takeaway
Q.8	Is the President required to seek SC advice via Article 143 whenever a Bill is reserved by Governor for President’s asssent?	No. The President is not required to seek the Supreme Court’s advice under Article 143 every time. The subjective satisfaction of the President is sufficient under Article 201.	Discretionary Advice. The President may seek advice if clarification is needed, but it is not a constitutional prerequisite.
Q.12, 13, 14	Questions on Article 145(3), the general scope of Article 142, and Article 131 jurisdiction.	These questions were deemed either irrelevant or overly broad for the functional nature of the reference and were returned unanswered.	Focus on Functionality. The Court maintained judicial discipline, refusing to answer speculative or general questions outside the immediate functional scope of the reference.