Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India & Ors. 2026 INSC 246

The petitioner, an adoptive mother of two children, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in the public interest.

The challenge was initially directed at Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (as amended in 2017), which was later replaced by a pari materia provision, Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 (Code).

The impugned provision granted 12 weeks of maternity benefit only to mothers who legally adopt a child below the age of three months.

The petitioner sought to declare this age restriction unconstitutional for being discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights.

On the violation of Article 14 and Components of Maternity Benefits: The Court examined the impugned provision through the settled doctrine of reasonable classification, which requires an intelligible differentia and a rational nexus with the legislative objective. It observed that the purpose of maternity benefit is not confined merely to biological recovery but extends to emotional bonding and caregiving responsibilities. The Court identified three elements of the maternity leave benefits: physical recovery from birth, emotional bonding, and integration of the child into the family. The Court observed that while biological mothers may require time for physical recovery, adoptive mothers equally require time for nurturing, bonding, and integrating the child into the family. Motherhood is a gradual process that takes shape in the heart and is not restricted to biological childbirth. The Court found that the need for such care does not diminish abruptly once the child crosses three months of age. Therefore, the classification was held to be under-inclusive, as it excluded similarly situated adoptive mothers without a reasonable basis. Consequently, the Court concluded that the three-month cutoff is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

On the violation of Article 21: The second issue concerned whether the impugned provision violates the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, particularly the rights of adoptive mothers and adopted children. The Court adopted an expansive interpretation of Article 21 and recognized motherhood as a facet of dignity and personal autonomy. It emphasized that motherhood is not limited to biological processes but includes emotional and social dimensions, especially in the context of adoption. The act of adopting a child was recognized as an exercise of reproductive choice and autonomy, deserving constitutional protection. Further, the Court invoked the principle of the “best interests of the child,” noting that early bonding and caregiving are essential for the child’s psychological and emotional development, regardless of the child’s age at adoption. Denial of maternity leave in such circumstances undermines both the dignity of the mother and the developmental needs of the child. Thus, the provision was held to be violative of Article 21 as it unjustifiably restricts the right to a dignified life, reproductive autonomy, and the child’s right to holistic development.

On workability of the impugned provision: The Court analysed the adoption timeline, noting that it is nearly impossible for a child to be legally free for adoption before they are at least two to four months old. It was observed that before a child is legally free for adoption under the JJ Act and CARA guidelines, several mandatory steps have to be completed which takes a minimum of 74 to 134 days time in cases of abandoned, surrendered or orphaned children, depending upon the circumstances of adoption. The Court also noted that an average adoption process takes 3 years to be completed. Hence, in such a light, if not impossible, it is highly unlikely that an adoptive mother receives a child below the age of three months. It gets even more difficult in the case of adoption of a child with disabilities. Thus, the Court held that the benefit under Section 60(4) of the Code becomes illusory in practice, the provision is virtually otiose, as most adoptive mothers would never qualify for it. It fails to achieve the purpose of supporting adoptive mothers. The Court further emphasized that legislative provisions must correspond to ground realities. If a statutory condition (like the 3-month limit) is disconnected from the actual functioning of the adoption system, it renders the law arbitrary and unreasonable.

The institutional invisibility of women’s care work and need for paternity leave: The Court highlighted the Wollstonecraft Dilemma, which is the tension between recognising women as caregivers and ensuring their equal participation in the workforce. A significant portion of women’s labour, especially in the form of childcare, nurturing, and household responsibilities, remains unpaid, unrecognized, and undervalued within formal legal and economic frameworks. When the law fails to account for caregiving responsibilities, it perpetuates gender inequality. Women are forced to choose between employment and caregiving. It observed that maternity benefit laws are not merely welfare provisions but are corrective mechanisms aimed at addressing this structural invisibility. Importantly, the Court highlighted that childcare is not solely a woman’s responsibility and stressed the urgent need for paternity leave policies. It was noted that absence of paternity leave perpetuates the idea that caregiving is exclusively maternal. The Court suggested that paternity leave would promote shared parenting as proximity is not identical to presence. Both the parents are indispensable for a child’s early development.